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SPIRITUAL TREATMENT EXEMPTIONS TO CHILD 
MEDICAL NEGLECT LAWS: WHAT v\TE 
OUTSIDERS SHOULD THINK 
James G. DwJer* 
There are strongly opposing views as to whether parents should 
be exempted from the normal legal responsibility to secure medical 
treatment for sick or injured children when the parents have religious 
objections to medical care. There are some who advocate an absolute 
exemption, 1 even in life-threatening situations, and some who argue 
that no exemption whatsoever should exist.2 Still others take an inter-
* Assistant Professor, College of William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of 1..'\w. 
I See John Dwight Ingram, Stale bzteiferma with Religious~· Motwal£tl Decisions on 
Medical Treat71U!1Zl, 93 DICK. L. REv. 41, 41 (1988) (arguing that "(t]hc constitutional 
protections of religious freedom prohibit the state from interfering '~ith religiouslr 
motivated decisions regarding the rendering of medical care"). 
2 See Henry J. Abraham, Abraham, Isaac and tile State: Faitll-Hmli11g and Ltgallnter· 
vention, 27 U. RICH. L REv. 951, 977 (1993) (arguing for repeal of spiritual tn.'3tment 
exemptions because this ''-would send the unambiguous message that, in the conte.xt 
of a medical emergency, prayer and faith-healing efforts, howe\·er laudable, caring 
and arguably efficacious they may be, are acceptable to the state only if a child's life or 
safety is also protected by the provision of any needed medical treatment"); Elizabeth 
A. Lingle, Treating Children by Faith: Colliding Constitutional Issues, 17 J. LEe. \L ~lEo. 301, 
330 (1996) (opposing exemptions); Ann MacLean Massie, Tile Religion Clauses and 
Parental Health Care Decisianmaking for Children: Suggestions for a New Approach, 21 lt\So 
TINes CoNsr. L.Q. 725, 739 (1994) (arguing that spiritual treatment e.xemptions \io-
Iate the Establishment Clause); Paula A. Monopoli, Allocating tile Costs of Parental Frre 
Exercise: Striking a New Balance Between Sincere Religious Belief and a Child's Rig/1t to Mcdi· 
cal Treatment, 18 P.EPP. L. REv. 319, 322 (1991) (arguing that lifting spiritual treatment 
exemptions would not abridge parents• rights to free exercise of religion); Rita Swan, 
Ph.D., On Statutes Depriving a Class of Children of Rights to .Medical Care: Can This Dis trim· 
ination be Litigated?, 2 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH LJ. 73, 92-94 (1998) (positing that spiritual 
treatment exemptions are unconstimtionai);Jennifer Trahan, Constitutional Law: Pa· 
rental Denial of a Child's Medical Treatment for Religious Reasons, 1989 M"N. SUR\'. k.t. L. 
307, 340 (1990) (proposing medical neglect statute that e.xpressl)' precludes exemp-
tion on the grounds of religious belief); see also American Academy of Pediatrics, 
&ligious Objections to Medical Care, 99 PEDIATRICS 279, 279 (1997) {stating AAP opposi-
tion to spiritual treatment e.xemptions); Andrew Skolnick, Religious Exemptions to Child 
Neglect Laws StiU Being Passed Despite Convictions of Parents, 264JAMA 1226, 1233 (1990) 
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mediate position-for example, that there should be an exemption in 
all but life-threatening situations. 3 The division of opinion is not sim-
ply between the members of religious groups who want such an ex-
emption for themselves and the rest of the world. There is division 
even among us "outsiders," we who are not members of a religious 
group with beliefs opposed to medical care and who therefore have 
no personal stake in the issue. I will discuss in this Essay only what 
position outsiders should take on the issue. I assume nearly all mem-
bers of the legal academic community are outsiders, and I believe we 
who are outsiders come at the issue from a perspective that is to a 
large extent similar as amongst ourselves, yet fundamentally different 
from that of the parents whose legal obligations are in question. In 
addition, the relevant legal question-whether the State should de-
cide to confer a particular legal power on certain people-is necessa-
rily one that must be addressed from the State's perspective, and the 
State's perspective is also an outsider perspective, since the State does 
not hold the religious beliefs of those who request that legal power. 
I. WHY WE OUTSIDERS DISAGREE AMoNGST OuRSELVES 
Outsiders on both sides of the issue are motivated primarily, I 
think, by compassion for the insiders in these religious groups-the 
parents, the children, perhaps even the group as a whole, which is 
striving to preserve its way of life. Why is it, then, if outsiders have no 
personal stake in the issue, but rather take an interest out of concern 
(stating opposition of American Medical Association to spiritual treatment 
exemptions). 
3 See Janna C. Merrick, Ph.D., Christian Science Healing of Minor Children: Spiritual 
Exemption Statutes, First Amendment Rights, and Fair Notice, 10 IssuES IN L. & MED. 321, 
341-42 (1994) (arguing for abrogation of spiritual treatment exemptions but cau-
tioning that courts should order treatment over the objection of parents "only in cases 
of very serious illness where reliable and proven therapies can effectively manage the 
disease"); Barry Nobel, Religious Healing in the Courts: The Liberties and Liabilities of Pa· 
tients, Parents and Healers, 16 U. PuGET SoUND L. REv. 599, 603 (1993) (taking the 
position that "[c]ourts should refrain from interfering with the parent-child relation· 
ship absent life-threatening circumstances accompanied by the probability-rather 
than the possibility-of medical cure"); LaDonna DiCamillo, Comment, Caught Be· 
tween the Clauses and the Branches: IDum Parents Deny Their Child Nontmergmcy Medical 
Treatment for Religious Reasons, 19 J. Juv. L. 123, 157 (1998) ("The state's interest is 
sufficiently compelling only when the risk associated with foregoing medical treat• 
mentis at a point when the child's life is immediately endangered, and the proposed 
treatement offers probable cure with minimal risk.");Jennifer L. Hartzell, Comment, 
Mother May I . . . Live? Parental Refusal of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment for Children 
Based on Religious Objections, 66 TENN. L. REv. 499, 528 (1999) (proposing that spiritual 
treatment exemptions be permitted except in cases where "the child's life may be 
threatened" or "the child's condition may result in a permanent disability"), 
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for the e},.'Perience of people inside these minority religious communi-
ties, that there is such a sharp division of opinion? Is it simply because 
we disagree about empirical issues so that differing assumptions about 
relevant facts lead us to translate our common concern into disparate 
legal and policy recommendations? I do not think so. I do not think 
we outsiders disagree significantly amongst ourselves regarding the 
facts. 
There is, for instance, no real dispute among us outsiders about 
the efficacy of modem medicine. lVe all believe that it is quite effec-
tive for certain things, though less so for others, that its efficacy is 
simply uncertain for some conditions, and that certain kinds of evi-
dence reliably inform conclusions about efficacy. And when our chil-
dren become seriously ill or injured, we take them to a doctor. ·we do 
not do that because it is some sort of cultural ritual we just happen to 
have been brought up to perform, without reflection or '\ithout sub-
jecting the practice to rigorous empirical scrutiny. \Ve do it because 
we have good reason to believe that for many physical problems it 
works better than any available alternative. \\Te have no doubt, for 
example, that if a child has diabetes, the most effective treatment 
available is administration of insulin. 
There is, additionally, no disagreement among us outsiders about 
the usefulness of positive thinking, about the ability of the mind to 
support physical responses to disease and injwy, and about the possi-
bility of using prayer and religious teaching as one form of such posi-
tive thinking. 4 But there is also no disagreement among us that 
positive thinking alone is not sufficiently efficacious for many physical 
probleins, particularly ·with children too young for their mental 
processes to work in this ·way. We outsiders all agree that medical care 
coupled with positive thinking, where that is possible, is the most effec-
tive approach, generally much more effective than positive thinking 
alone. Thus, we all try to comfort our children when they are seri-
ously ill and assure them that they will soon be better, but we also give 
them medicine, if there is medicine with demonstrated ability to cure 
the disease or ameliorate suffering without causing negative side e.f: 
fects that outweigh the benefits. 
Finally, there is no disagreement among us outsiders about the 
potential psychological consequences of one legal rule or another on 
4 I am not suggesting here that people who pray for healing believe they are 
simply engaging in positive thinking. Rather, I assume that the State, from its secular 
perspective, may view prayer as efficacious in healing because of the posith·e psycho-
logical states it entails, but may not assume prayer is efficacious because God responds 
to it. The latter assumption would involve the State deciding religious questions. 
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the adults and children in these religious groups. Parents may experiM 
ence great anxiety, fear, and anger if forced to secure medical treat· 
ment for their children in violation of their sense of religious 
obligation and contrary to what they believe to be best for their chil-
dren. Other adult members of the religious community may also be 
affected by compelled medical treatment, perhaps by experiencing a 
sense of threat to, or violation of, their chosen way of life by the 
outside world. And children, too, might experience some anxiety, 
fear, and/ or anger as a result of the State preventing their parents 
from fulfilling religious commands. 
Importantly, though, adults and children in these religious com-
munities may also experience great anxiety and fear if the State does 
not compel medical care and if the child's condition does not im· 
prove. I doubt that members of the Church of Christ Scientist watch 
their children suffer and die with equanimity, and the children them· 
selves might be terrified, in addition to suffering physical pain. Some· 
times people are relieved to be compelled to do things their religion 
precludes them from doing voluntarily. And sometimes religious 
groups adapt doctrinally to the legal environment in which they live 
by excusing adherents from moral responsibility for doing that which 
the State commands.5 The psychological effects of compelled medical 
care are therefore complex, cutting in both directions. 
There may be other categories of relevant facts, but those are the 
m.Yor ones. If, then, there is no real disagreement among us outsidM 
ers as to factual issues, why is there such disagreement among us as to 
what the law should be? One explanation is that we sometimes fail to 
give proper consideration to all the interests at stake. We focus on 
just a subset of all the affected interests and ignore or under-value 
others. Some might think only about the affront to parents and to 
religious groups and the anxiety that members of a family or commu-
nity might experience as a result of compelled medical care. They 
may give insufficient attention or weight to the physical and mental 
suffering of the children who fail to receive medical care for their 
illness or injury. That is clearly inappropriate. Others might think. 
5 See, e.g., In re President of Georgetown Coli., Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1007 (D.C. 
Cir. 1964) (relating view of adult Jehovah's Witness patient that if a court ordered a 
blood transfusion, "it would not then be her responsibility"); United States v. George, 
239 F. Supp. 752, 753 (D. Conn. 1965) (relating statement by an adult patient that his 
"conscience was clear" because the responsibility for receiving medical care would be 
"upon the Court's conscience"); In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d 286, 289 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), 
affd in pan and rev'd in pan, 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989) (noting an assertion by the 
State that the patient's church would view the transfusion as "the court's transgres· 
sion, not her own, and would support rather than punish her"). 
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only about the suffering and danger that the children might incur as a 
result of not receiving medical care, having little sympathy for the par-
ents and other members of the religious group and disregarding the 
potential psychological consequences for children of compelling med-
ical care. This is also deficient, at least in terms of personal moral 
outlook, though I '\vill offer reasons below for thinking that it is appro-
priate for the State to disregard the adults' interests in its decision 
making process. 
Perhaps the greatest cause of the disagreement among outsiders, 
however, is confusion about the significance of the insiders' perspec-
tive. 6 Supporters of exemptions point out that the insiders' perspec-
tive differs from ours in at least two ways. First, insiders perceive 
certain spiritual interests, of their own and of their children, that we 
outsiders do not perceive because we do not share their religious be-
liefs.7 Those spiritual interests count against medical care for their 
children, and insiders assign great weight to those spiritual interests. 
Second, some groups disagree with us outsiders on the relative effi-
cacy of medical treatment in general. They think prayer is more effec-
tive in curing illness or healing injury and may even believe medical 
treatment to be counter-productive, because seeking it makes them 
less able to secure, or less worthy of, divine healing assistance. s Many 
outsiders who support religious exemptions believe insider parents 
are entitled to act on the basis of their beliefs or that the State ought 
to defer to the insiders' perspective.9 
Disagreement among us outsiders thus sterns principally from two 
sources-a disparity as to whose interests we emphasize and a disparity 
as to what role we assign to the insiders' perspective. The remainder 
of this Essay will support the following uvo positions: first, the interests 
6 For description of the beliefs of particular religious groups that oppose medi-
cal care and the effects these beliefs ha\'e had on children, see general!)' Seth M. 
Asser, M.D. & Rita Swan, Ph.D., Child Fatalities from Rdigion-.Motit•alcd .Medical Neglect, 
101 PEDIATRICS 625 (1998); Rita Swan, Children, M<didne, Religion, tmd the Lau•, 44 
ADVANCES IN PEDIATRICS 491 (1997). 
7 See, e.g., Ingram, supra note 1, at 62; DiCamillo, supra note 3, at 143--44; Anne 
D. Lederman, Note, Understanding Faith: lWren Religious Parenls Dccli11e Com:mlirmal 
Medical Treatment for Their Children, 45 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 891, 918 (1995). 
8 See, e.g., Lederman, supra note 7, at 892-93 (1995); Deboral1 Sussman Steckler, 
Note, A Trend Toward Declining mgor in ApplJing Free Exercise Prirlcip!es: Tile Example of 
State Courts' Consideration of Christian Science Treatment for Children, 36 N.Y.L. So1. L. 
REv. 487, 488, 502 (1991) (describing beliefs of Christian ScientisiS). 
9 See, e.g., Ingram, supra note 1, at 65 ("The first amendment prohibiiS the state 
from prescribing that physical life on earth is more important than life hereafter. 
Every person has the right to make that critical decision. Similar!)', pareniS hn\'e the 
right to make that decision for their children .... "); ste also illfta Parts II.B.2, II.C. 
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of the children involved should be decisive; second, the State must not 
defer to the insiders' perspective as to what the children's interests 
are, but rather must decide what the legal rule will be on the basis of 
the State's own judgment regarding the children's interests. These 
two positions support a conclusion that if it is ever permissible for 
parents to fail, for religious reasons, to secure medical care for a sick 
or injured child, it is only in cases of illness or ir:Uury that are so minor 
that failure to provide medical treatment ordinarily would not trigger 
state action anyway, even in the absence of a spiritual treatment ex~ 
emption. Because spiritual treatment exemptions would operate in 
practice only in cases where, I conclude, the State should not permit 
parents to deny children medical care, spiritual treatment exemptions 
to medical neglect laws are unwarranted. 
I will preface my brief arguments for these two positions by em~ 
phasizing that what is at issue in this debate is state decision-making. 
Supporters of spiritual treatment exemptions, and of religious exemp-
tions to parental legal responsibilities in other contexts, tend to over-
look the facts that the State makes legal rules (laws do not fall out of 
the sky) and that asking for an exemption from the usual parental 
legal responsibilities therefore means asking the State to make a cer-
tain decision. Consequently, they also overlook the fact that any argu-
ment for an exemption must appeal to considerations the State may 
properly take into account in its decision making. This means, most 
importantly, that supporters of exemptions cannot appeal to the truth 
of certain religious beliefs, since the State may not assume that any 
particular religious beliefs are true.10 It also means, for the same rea-
son, that supporters of exemptions cannot expect the State itself to 
adopt the insiders' perspective, insofar as it is based on religious 
beliefs. 
10 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989) ("The Establish-
ment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a positlon 
on questions of religious belief."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Parades, Public Squares aud 
Voucher Payments: Problems of Gavernment Neutrality, 28 CoNN. L. REv. 2'13, 258 (1996) 
("Government itself may espouse any viewpoint a democratic majority wishes exupt a 
religious viewpoint."). In McGowan v. Maryland, Justice Frankfurter stated: 
The Establishment Clause withdrew from the sphere of legitimate legislative 
concern and competence a specific, but comprehensive, area of human con· 
duct: man's belief or disbelief in the verity of some transcendental idea and 
man's expression in action of that belief or disbelief. Congress may not 
make these matters, as such, the subject of legislation, nor, now, may any 
legislature in this country. 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 465-66 (1961) (Frankfurter,]., concurring). 
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II. How nm STATE SHoULD Go ABoUT DECIDING 
The first question that must be answered, then, is how the State 
should go about deciding whether to grant some parents an exemp-
tion from the normal legal responsibility to secure medical care for a 
sick or injured child. The two leading theories of state decision mak-
ing favor a utilitarian approach or a rights-based approach. Below is a 
brief sketch of how those two approaches would apply to the matter of 
spiritual treatment exemptions. 
A. A Utilitarian Approach 
Under this approach, the State would take into account the inter-
ests of every person who might be affected by its decision, assigning 
relative weights to the various interests and balancing them to reach 
its decision. In favor of exemptions, from the State's perspective, 
would be principally the interest of adult members of the religious 
group in having their preferences for the children's lives satisfied and 
in avoiding all the bad feelings mentioned above-anxiety, fear, an-
ger, offense, and sense of threat to their ·way of life. Also counting in 
favor of the exemptions would be the children's interest in avoiding 
whatever bad feelings compelled medical care might produce in 
them. This interest of children would vary considerably, depending 
on the children's ages and on the extent to which their parents at-
tempted to insulate them from such effects, as one might e::...-pect lov-
ing parents to do. Counting against exemptions would be the anxiety 
and fear the adults might experience as a result of the children's con-
tinued suffering and, most importantly, the interests of the children 
in receiving medical care-interests in avoiding not merely anxiety 
and fear, but also pain and other forms of physical discomfort, loss or 
impairment of functioning body parts, and heightened risk of death. 
Balancing those competing interests would most likely lead the 
State to establish guidelines requiring parents to secure medical care 
for some illnesses and injuries but not for others. For very minor ail-
ments-a cold, perhaps, or a small cut-the State might rationally 
conclude that compelling violation of religious commands would 
cause more harm than it prevented, when everyone's interests are 
taken into account. At the other e.xtreme, where life-threatening, but 
treatable, problems arise-meningitis or a serious accident-the state 
would rationally conclude that it would do more good than harm, 
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when everyone's interests are taken into account, to require parents to 
secure medical care.11 
11 I speak here of requiring parents to secure medical care, but if there Wt!re 
some alternative way to ensure a child receives medical care that is just as effective 
and that avoids some of the religious conflict for the parent, then I see no reason not 
to take that approach-for example, if there might be some way to ensure the Stat<.• is 
notified whenever a child is sick or injured, so that it could assume a temporary and 
limited guardianship for purposes of authorizing treaunent. What is important is that 
the children receive the care, not how exactly that is made to happen. Several com· 
mentators have proposed a reporting requirement as an alternative to civil and crimi· 
nal neglect proceedings. See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 2, at 977; Stephen L. Carter, 
The Free Exercise Thereof, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1627, 1653-54 (1997); Jennifer L. 
Rosato, Putting Square Pegs in a Round Hole: Procedural Due Process and the Effect of Faith 
Healing Exemptions on the Prosecution of Faith Healing Parents, 29 U .S.F. L. REv. 43, 117 
(1994); Daniel]. Kearney, Note, Parental Failure to Provide Child with Medical Assistance 
Based on Religious Beliefs Causing Child's Death-Involuntary Manslaughter in Perm· 
sylvania, 90 DICK. L. REv. 861, 885 (1986); Eric W. Treene, Note, Prayer-Treatment Ex· 
emptions to Child Abuse and Neglect Statutes, Manslaughter Prosecutions, and Due Process of 
Law, 30 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 135, 171-76 (1993). However, imposing a reporting duty 
on parents and "faith healers" has proven ineffective as a means of accomplishing this 
purpose, because members of these religious groups flout reporting requirements just 
as readily as they flout the basic duty to secure medical care for a child themselves. 
See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 871 (Cal. 1988) ("Under ordinary 
circumstances, ... the case of a true believer in faith healing will not even come to the 
attention of the authorities, unless and until someone dies."); Christine A. Clark, Rf-
ligious Accom1TUJdation and Criminal Liabilt.'ty, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 559, 566, 576, 580 
(1990) (describing a case in Florida in which parents and Christian Scientist pmcti· 
tioners allowed a child to die of a treatable medical condition without notifying state 
officials of her illness despite the existence of a state statute requiring Christian Sci· 
ence practitioners to notify a state agency when a sick child is being treated only with 
prayer); Kearney, supra, at 885-86 (same); Lederman, supra note 7, at 923 (explain· 
ing why threat of legal punishment has little deterrent effect on Christian Science 
parents). For some religious groups, such as the Christian Science church, it is just as 
wrong to acknowledge the existence of a disease as·it is to get medical treatment for it. 
"It is no more Christianly scientific to see disease than it is to experience it." MARY 
BAKER EDDY, SciENCE AND HEALTH WITH KEY TO THE SCRIPTURES 421 (First Church of 
Christ, Scientist 1994) (1875). 
If it becomes necessary to startle mortal mind to break its dream of suffering, 
vehemently tell your patient that he must awake. Tum his gaze from the 
false evidence of the senses to the harmonious facts of Soul and immortal 
being. Tell him that he suffers only as the insane suffer, from false beliefs . 
. . . There is no disease. 
Id. at 420-21. 
Moreover, even if parents do report that their child is sick, their religious views 
may lead them to grossly mischaracterize the child's condition, with the result that 
state child protective workers are led to believe the illness is much less serious than it 
really is. Currently, statutory child neglect reporting requirements in many statt•s also 
contain a spiritual treatment exemption making it more likely that the State will not 
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More refined empirical analysis would be necessary to figure out 
where exactly the line should be drawn between the very minor and 
the very serious cases.12 I am not aware that anyone has done such an 
empirical analysis, least of all the legislatures that enacted spiritual 
treatment exemptions. I suspect the line would not be far above the 
most minor cases, because it seems likely that in any case ·where there 
is a substantial risk to the child of either substantial short-term suffer-
ing or significant long-term impairment, the child's interests in favor 
of receiving medical attention outw-eigh all other interests, which are 
for the most part-from the State's perspective-simply unpleasant 
psychological states. Additionally, the very minor cases are ones that 
medical neglect laws would not cover anyway-that is, ones in which 
become aware of a child's illness, if at all, until after the child is dead. Ste Rosato, 
supra, at 52 n.44; Treene, supra, at 143. Eliminating these exemptions would be a step 
in the right direction, but would not be sufficient to protect the cltildrcn. 
It is not clear how the State can effectively compel parents to secure medical care 
for their children; if they are determined to follow their religious beliefs regardless of 
what the law is. Two possible means of doing so are (1) to eliminate all existing 
exemptions in civil neglect laws, so that no parent is led to believe the State tolerates 
this form of neglect to any degree, and (2) to impose stiff sentences under criminal 
neglect and involuntary manslaughter laws for parents who flout their legal responsi-
bilities, something courts have been-as insider parents well know-reluctant to do. 
See Kearney, supra, at 866 (" UJudicial recognition of the harshness ofimposing crimi-
nal liability has resulted in the imposition of moderate sentences ..•. "); Edward Egan 
Smith, Note, The Criminalizaiion of Belief: When Free Exercise lsn '1, 42 R\STlNCS L.J. 1491, 
1511 (1991) (noting that a "number of comictions of faith healing parents • • • ha\·c 
been overturned on technical grounds unrelated to the underl)ing charge" and sug-
gesting judicial sympathy for these parents}; Treene, supra, at 171-76 (discussing the 
conflicting messages parents receive from ci\il neglect laws that contain a spiritual 
treatment exemption and criminal neglect and involuntary manslaughter laws that do 
not); id. at 197-98 (noting the lenient sentence in a criminal comiction of parents 
who caused a child to die by neglecting to secure medical care). 
12 In theory, the legal obligation might best be stated in terms of what response 
from parents is required when certain symptoms are present, rather than (or perhaps 
in addition to) stating it in terms of what parents must do when a child has a particu-
lar disease or when a substantial risk is present, since the latter would require parents 
to make medical judgments they likely are not prepared to make. In practice, 
though, specifYing which symptoms should trigger action might be quite difficult. 
The practical difficulty of precisely identif}ing the S)mptoms that signal a serious or 
potentially serious problem provides an additional reason for excusing failure to se-
cure medical care only in the most minor cases. See Clark, Slzpra note 11, at 585-86, 
589 (describing cases in which illnesses that appeared on the surface to be Jess serious 
turned out to be life-threatening); cf. id. at 589 ("Families who rei)' on spiritual heal-
ing need a more certain standard to guide their daily decisions."). Clark also notes 
that the religious beliefs of Christian Scientist parents would make them less able to 
identify signs of serious illness, because those beliefs include the dew that disease is 
an illusion. See id. at 586. 
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failure to secure medical care ordinarily would not trigger action by a 
state agency even when the failure is not motivated by religious objec-
tion to medical care, simply because any harm to the children is slight. 
As such, a religious exemption would serve no legitimate purpose. 
That said, if a balancing of interests is a proper approach to drawing 
the line, it really ought to be done by people more suited to the task 
than are legal academics. 
That is a quick take on a utilitarian approach. I know of no one 
who takes such an approach to this issue, at least not self-consciously 
and rigorously. As noted above, outsiders who speak to the issue tend 
to focus just on a subset of all interests. This might be reasoning with 
blinders on, or it might be that they favor more of a rights-based ap-
proach, which shortcuts the decision making process somewhat by 
honing in on the people who have such great interests at stake that 
they might be said to have a right to protection of their interests. This 
right trumps consideration of the non-right protected interests of 
others. A rights-based approach is certainly a defensible one, and it is 
the approach typically taken to medical decision making by or for 
adults, so let us see what the State should conclude if it applied that 
approach. 
B. A Rights-Based Approach 
Who is the best candidate for being a right-holder in this context? 
The answer to that question is so obvious that it is bewildering how 
little attention is paid to these persons by supporters of exemptions. 
The sick or injured child is, of course, the best candidate for being a 
right-holder. It is the child's body and the child's life that are the 
subject of discussion. Imagine having legal decisions and scholarly ar-
guments regarding the medical treatment of elderly, incompetent 
persons turn on the rights of family members, while largely ignoring 
the rights of the elderly person. We would regard that as not merely 
improper, but also morally offensive. Yet that is what routinely hap-
pens with children in this context (and many others). 
I am not aware that any supporter of exemptions has ever explic-
itly denied that children have the most important interests and rights 
at stake in this matter, and I cannot imagine anyone doing so. In-
stead, many simply ignore the children, treating the conflict as one 
involving only parents, religious communities, and the State;13 per-
haps suspecting that it is not possible to articulate a plausible argu-
ment that children have a right to spiritual treatment exemptions. 
13 See, e.g., Ingram, supra note 1, at 65; Smith, supra note 11, at 1510; Steckler, 
supra note 8, at 514-15. 
2000] SPIRITUAL TREATMENT EXElltPTIONS 157 
Ignoring the welfare and rights of the children is clearly inappropri-
ate. Other supporters of exemptions have a different strategy for deal-
ing with children's rights, which is to argue that the State should defer 
to parents' views about what the content of their children's rights is, 
just as they argue that the State must defer to parents' views of what 
their children's interests are. I address that deference argument in 
Section C. 
1. Giving Content to Children's Rights 
To say that children are the best candidates for being right-hold-
ers is not to demonstrate the correctness of any ultimate conclusion; it 
is necessary first to give content to the rights of the children. So what 
content should our legal system give to children's rights in this con-
text?14 A comparison with the rights of adults who have never been 
competent is instructive. Never-competent adults, many of whom are 
still in the care of their parents, are entitled to have decisions about 
their medical care based on their interests and not on the interests of 
their caretakers.15 Requests by parents of mentally retarded women to 
have them sterilized are a case in point. For such a procedure to be 
undertaken, guardians must show that the benefits of the procedure 
for the woman outweigh its costs for her.1G The guardian's own inter-
14 I pose this primarily as a moral, rather than doctrinal, legal question, and for 
the pmpose of critiquing existing doctrine, which gives little recognition to the rights 
of children in religious child-rearing contexts. See James G. D\\}'er, Parents' Rtligirm 
and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 C.u. L. REv. 1371, 
1379-405 (1994). The argument here that analogizes children's situations to that of 
incompetent adults could, however, be couched in terms of legal doctrine interpret-
ing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. One could argue 
that children are similarly situated to never-competent adults and so should receive 
the same legal protections for their physical well-being. Further below, I ad\-ancc a 
different sort of equal protection argument, one that argues against discrimination 
among groups of children based on the religious beliefs of their parents. See infra 
notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
15 See John E. Donaldson, Reform of Adult Guardianship Law, 32 U. RICH. L. RE\•. 
1273, 1291-93 (1998) (describing the law of guardianship in Virginia); Hal 
Fliegelman & Debora C. Fliegelman, Giving Guardians tl1e Pau•tr To Do Medicaid Plan-
ning, 32 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 341, 349-51 (1997). 
16 See, e.g., In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 612-13 (Alaska 1981); In re Debra B., 495 
A2d 781, 782-83 (Me. 1985); In re Wirsing, 573 N.W.2d 51, 55 (Mich. 1998); In re 
Grady, 426 A2d 467, 474-75 (NJ. 1981); Estate of C.W., 640 A2d 427, 428 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1994); see also Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of Mentallj• Rttardtd Persons: 
Reproductive Rights and Family Privacy, 1986 DuKE L.J. 806, 817-23 (e:·:plaining the cur-
rent sterilization laws in different states, and finding that a court generally may au-
thorize sterilization for an incompetent woman only if it finds clear and comincing 
evidence that sterilization would be in the woman's best interests). 
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ests do not factor into the determination.!' There is no good reason 
why children should not have the same right, a right to have decisions 
about their medical care based on their interests rather than on the 
interests of their caretakers-that is, their parents. 
In practice, this would mean that the children in these religious 
groups have a right to medical care whenever the benefits for them of 
receiving care outweigh whatever costs such care might entail for them, 
all things considered. In other words, in establishing guidelines for 
parental responsibility to secure medical care, the State should bal~ 
ance only the children's interests. From the State's perspective, the 
costs of compelled medical care would include any effects on chil~ 
dren's psychological well being from seeing their parents' wishes 
thwarted or from believing that such treatment will violate God's will 
and perhaps even harm them, if they are old enough to have s~ch 
thoughts. The costs would not include a threat to the children's 
chances for salvation or damage to their relationship with God, since 
the State may not make judgments about those things. Guidelines 
based on a balancing of the costs the State can recognize against the 
psychological and physical benefits of medical care might still exclude 
some truly minor cases from compulsory medical care, but presuma-
bly fewer than when the interests of adults were in the mLx. And as 
noted above, truly minor illnesses or injuries would not be covered by 
medical neglect laws anyway, so there would be no warrant for includ-
ing a religious exemption in neglect statutes. Again, it does not a~ 
pear that anyone has done such a balancing of costs and benefits in a 
rigorous way, and legal academics-including myself-would not a~ 
pear particularly well-equipped to do it. What I aim to establish here 
is the moral position that children of the members of these religious 
groups possess a right to have decisions about their health care made 
solely on the basis of their interests. 
Importantly, the right of incompetent adults to have decisions 
based on what is best for them is not affected by the religious beliefs 
17 See, e.g., In re Debra B., 495 A.2d at 782 (noting that the purpose of state legis-
lation concerning sterilization of incompetent adults is "to ensure that no person who 
is incapable of informed consent may be sterilized unless the operation is necessary to 
that person's best interests"); In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1982) ("[I]n making the decision of whether to authorize sterilization, a court should 
consider only the best interest of the incompetent person, not the interests or conve· 
nience of the individual's parents, the guardian or of society .... "); see au·a Scott, 
supra note 16, at 821-22 (stating that current law excludes consideration of parents' 
interests from the sterilization decision). 
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of their caretakers.18 In fact, it would be unconstitutional for a State 
to diminish or eliminate an incompetent adult's rights because of the 
religious beliefs of her caretaker. The State would be affording cer-
tain incompetent adults lesser protection of the laws than it gives to 
others, for reasons not tied to their well being, and would therefore 
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
There is no good reason why children of Christian Scientists should 
not have a similar equal protection right to the same legal protection 
of their welfare that other children receive. If spiritual treatment ex-
emptions compromise their welfare, they violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.19 An Ohio court struck down the religious exemption in that 
state's child medical neglect laws for precisely this reason. In doing 
so, the court explained: 
[I] f the real purpose of [the neglect law] is to protect children from 
parental defalcation, then the prayer exception creates a group of 
children who will never be so protected, through no fault or choice 
of their own. . . . 'Why ... should children not be afforded special 
protection by our laws, each child on an equal basis with every other 
child, where the denial of that protection may injure or cripple the 
child for life or even result in that child's premature death? This 
special protection should be guaranteed to all such children until 
they have their own opportunity to make life's important religious 
decisions for themselves upon attainment of the age of reason. Af-
ter all, given the opportunity when grown up, a child may someday 
choose to reject the most sincerely held of his parents' religious be-
liefs, just as the parents on trial here have apparently grown to re-
ject some beliefs of their parents. Equal protection should not be 
18 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A2d 647, 661-62 (NJ. 1976) (rejecting a claim b)' 
the parents of an adult in a persistent vegetati\'C state that they had a right based on 
their religious beliefs to decide that life support would be tcmtinatcd and stating, 
"[w]e do not recognize an independent parental right of religious freedom to sup-
port the relief requested"). 
19 For an extended argument that spiritual treatment exemptions in child neg-
lect laws violate the equal protection rights of children who are consequently denied 
necessary medical care, see generally James G. Dwyer, Tile Children We Abandon: Relig-
ious Exemptwns to Child Welfare and Education Laws as Denials of Equal Protcclirm lo Chil· 
dren of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1321 {1996). &e also Massie, st~pra note 2, at 
731-32 (noting that, although children ha\'e ne\'er been defined as a suspect class 
under the equal protection doctrine, courts have traditionally "regarded governmen-
tal actions specifically affecting the welfare of children nith special care"); Monopoli, 
supra note 2, at 348-49 (1991) (regardless of how cllildren whose parents practice 
spiritual healing are classified under the equal proection doctrine, the coun must at 
least find the exception rationally related to the statute's purpose for enactement); 
Swan, supra note 2, at 92-94 (referring to four state court cases that hold a religious 
exemption statute pertaining to children violates the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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denied to innocent babies, whether under the label of "religious 
freedom" or othenvise. 20 
To avoid the imputation of unconstitutionality, a State would 
need a valid reason for treating these children differently, and a valid 
reason would only be one that rested on the interests of the children 
themselves.21 To the extent that these children are similarly situated 
to other children-that is, have the same interests as other children-
spiritual treatment exemptions cannot be saved from the equal pr<r 
tection charge. Children of insiders are somewhat differently situated, 
because their psychological interests are shaped to some degree by 
their parents' religious beliefs, but othenvise the State must regard 
these children as having the same interests as other children have in 
avoiding pain, disfigurement, impairment, and death. If the State 
fails to accord the same weight to the interests of insiders' children 
that it gives to the interests of outsiders' children, it violates the right 
of insiders' children to equal protection.22 
In sum, a comparison 'vith never-competent adults suggests that 
children in general have a substantive moral right to medical decision 
making based on their interests and that children of "religious objec-
tors" have a formal legal right to equal protection of the laws-in par-
ticular, to the protection afforded by laws guarding children's 
fundamental interest in physical health. A spiritual treatment exemp-
tion violates those rights unless the State can demonstrate that the 
exemption is really in the children's best interests, as the State sees 
20 Ohio v. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d 931, 935-36 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1984); see also 
Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 223 (Miss. 1979) (invalidating a religious exemption 
to Mississippi's child immunization law as a violation of children's right to equal pro-
tection of child welfare laws). 
21 For an explanation of why parents' rights and interests cannot provide a lcgiti· 
mate basis for such discrimination, see Dwyer, supra note 19, at 1423-33. 
22 See RoNALD DwoRKIN, A MATIER oF PRINCIPLE 191 (1985) ("[T]here is broad 
agreement within modem politics that the government must treat all its citizens with 
equal concern and respect .... "); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 3: The Place 
of Liberty, 73 IowA L. REv. 1, 7 (1987) ("[W]e are now united in accepting the abstract 
egalitarian principle: government must act to make the lives of those it governs better 
lives, and it must show equal concern for the life of each."); Gregory Vlastos, Justice 
and Equality, in THEORIES OF Rioms 41, 41-42 Qeremy Waldron ed., 1984) (noting 
that this notion of formal equality of consideration has been embedded in the con· 
cept of justice since its origins in Ancient Greece); cJ. FCC v. Beach Communications, 
Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 323 n.3 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[W]hen Congress im· 
poses a burden on one group, but leaves unaffected another that is similarly, though 
not identically, situated, ... we should inquire whether the classification is rationally 
related to 'a legitimate purpose that we may reasonably presume to have motivated an 
impartial legislature.'" (quoting U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (1980) 
(Stevens, J., concurring))). 
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them. I am not aware that any supporter of exemptions has made that 
case. The "as the State sees them" modifier still requires support, and 
this is coming in Section C, but first I must say something about par-
ents' rights, which preoccupy the courts and supporters of 
exemptions. 
2. Parents' Rights 
Supporters of exemptions typically assert that parents in these re-
ligious groups have a prima facie right to withhold medical care from 
their children, a right that is outweighed by other considerations, if 
ever, only in the most extreme cases.23 They typically do not claim the 
same right for other parents-that is, those for whom it is not a matter 
of religious principle. Rather, they conceive of the right as primarily 
one of religious freedom.24 There is in our constitutional scheme a 
general right to religious freedom, though today it does not by itself 
support claims for exemptions from generally applicable legal obliga-
tions.25 The general right is founded upon the liberal principle of 
self-determination, which holds that people are better off in the long 
run and receive the respect they are due as moral agents when the 
23 See, e.g., Ingram, supra note 1, at 60, 65; Nobel, supra note 3, at 636; DiCamillo, 
supra note 3, at 143-44; Lederman, supra note 7, at 907 (arguing that parents' free 
exercise right is never outweighed by the interests of their children); Shelli Dawn 
Robinson, Comment, Commonwealth v. Twitchell: 'Who Owns the Child?, 7 J. CoNTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 413, 431 (1991); Smith, supra note 11, at 1510; Steckler, supra 
note 8, at 519. 
24 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 11, at 587-89; Nobel, supra note 3, at 636 ("To pro-
mote religious liberty and family integrity, judges should rarely second-guess consen-
sual family healthcare decisions based on religious considerations."); id. at 660 
(describing judicial rejection of parental claims to a free exercise right to provide 
"religious treatment alone" as an "aberration of free exercise jurisprudence"); Kear-
ney, supra note 11, at 889; Lederman, supra note 7, at 894-95, 898; Robinson, supra 
note 23, at 425-29; Steckler, supra note 8, at 519; cJ. Lainie Friedman Ross & Timothy 
J. Aspinwall, Religious Exemptions to the Immunization Statutes: Balancing Public Health and 
Religious Freedom, 25 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 202, 205 (1997) (arguing in favor of religious 
exemptions to child immunization laws, on the basis of parents' right to religious 
freedom). But see Robinson, supra note 23, at 431 (asserting that parents should be 
excused for medical neglect regardless of the reason for their failure to secure medi-
cal care-or in other words, that there should be no such thing as medical neglect of 
children). 
25 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990) (holding that 
facially neutral and generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religious prac-
tice do not violate the Free Exercise Clause, but distinguishing cases-such as relig-
ious parenting-that involve an additional constitutional right, such as a substantive 
due process right, by suggesting that the second right somehow enhances the free 
exercise claim). 
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State lets them live their mvn lives by their mvn lights. 26 The greatest 
restriction on the right is the harm principle-religious freedom, like 
freedom more generally, is properly curtailed when it threatens signif-
icant hann to other persons, as the State sees it.27 
The Supreme Court, in its important 1990 free exercise decision, 
Employment Division v. Smith, 28 treated parental free exercise rights dif-
ferently from ordinary free exercise rights, as it should have. How-
ever, the Court got things backwards. The case before the Court 
involved claims by Native American adults, on behalf of themselves, 
that Oregon law prohibiting use of peyote violated their free exercise 
rights.29 The Court held that generally applicable laws that are neu-
tral as to religion, as Oregon's drug laws were, do not violate the Free 
Exercise Clause even if they incidentally burden religious practice.30 
Such laws do not trigger the strict scrutiny sometimes applied in the 
past in free exercise cases. In dictum, Smith suggested that parental 
free exercise rights are stronger than free exercise rights in non-child 
rearing contexts-specifically, that they might still trigger strict scru-
tiny.31 But clearly, the case for attributing rights is weakerwhen a per-
son seeks protection of action directed at controlling the lives of other 
persons than when the right-holder is engaging in self-determination. 
Surely any right I have to direct my children's lives should be weaker 
than the right I have to control my mvn life, not vice versa. At best, 
the parental free exercise right should be a relatively weak one, insuf-
ficient to block state action that promotes the health of children. 
Decisions of the Supreme Court in which child rearing was di-
rectly at issue support this conclusion. In only two of those cases-
Prince v. Massachusetts32 and Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospi-
tal33-'\vas the record deemed to support a finding that parents' 
26 See joHN LoCKE, A LEITER CoNCERNING ToLERATION 38 Uames H. Tully ed., 
Hackett Pub. Co. 1983) (1689); joHN STUART MILL, ON LIBER1Y 53-73 (Elizabeth 
Rapaport ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 1978) (1859); joHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF juSTICE 
543-44 (1971); see also Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[O]ur notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with 
our idea of physical freedom and self-determination."). 
27 See 1 joEL FEINBERG, THE MoRAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAw: H.J\RM TO 
OTHERS 10-12 (1985); MrLL, supra note 26, at 9. Legal decisions concerning refusal 
of medical care by competent adults are consistent with this description of rights and 
their limitations. See Nobel, supra note 3, at 616-20. 
28 494 u.s. 872 (1990). 
29 See id. at 874. 
30 See id. at 882. 
31 See id. 
32 321 u.s. 158 (1944). 
33 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), affd per curiam, 390 U.S. 598 (1968). 
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choices would harm the children at issue, and in both cases the Court 
rejected the parents' free exercise claim. In Princ-e, the Court held 
that simply allowing a child to distribute religious pamphlets in the 
streets posed sufficient danger to the child's welfare as to justify are-
striction on the parents' child-rearing freedom.34 In King Crmnl)' Hos-
pita~ the Court affirmed without opinion35 a lower court decision to 
order blood transfusions for a child who needed surgery O\'er the re-
ligious objection of the child's Jehovah's 'Witness parents.36 
In fact, the State arguably should not assign any 1iglll-that is, any 
legal entitlement-to protect choices and actions that are not a matter 
of self-determination. Such a right finds no support in general liberal 
political principles. To view religiously-motivated child medical neg-
lect as a First Amendment issue is as much a conceptual mistake as it 
would be to view religiously-motivated wife-beating as a First Amend-
ment issue. Additionally, this right directly conflicts with a principle 
that is basic to our legal and moral culture-namely, that no one is 
entitled to control the life of another person in accordance \\ith their 
own preferences. This principle is manifest not only in the abolition 
of slavery and in the demise of the coverture regime in domestic rela-
tions law, but also in the legal rules governing caretaking for incompe-
tent adults.37 Guardians for incompetent adults are not deemed 
entitled to direct the life of the ward in a \vay that furthers the guardi-
ans' own interests, nor to have a right to decide what the ward's inter-
ests are, to the exclusion of efforts by the State to constrain a 
guardian's discretion. Rather, they are deemed to occupy a fiduciary 
role as a matter of legal privilege. 
This same principle supports the conclusion that parents, too, 
should not be deemed right-holders in this situation at all, but rather 
should be viewed as fiduciaries occupying a caretaking role as a matter 
34 See 321 U.S. at 170. The Coun also indicated in dictum that parental free 
exercise rights were inadequate to suppon a claim for exemption from child immuni-
zation laws, stating that a parent "cannot claim freedom from compulsory \"acdnation 
for the child more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice relig-
ion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communi-
cable disease or the latter to ill health or death." Id. at 166-67 (citation omitted); ge 
also Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 223 (Miss. 1979) (rejecting parenlal free exercise 
challenge to child immunization requirement and stating, "To the extent that [immu-
nization] may conflict with the religious beliefS of a parent. howe\·er sincerely enter-
tained, the interests of the school children must prevail"). 
35 See 390 U.S. at 598. 
36 King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. at 504.-05. 
37 For an extended exposition of this point. sec D\\}"Cr, supra note 14, at 1405-23. 
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of legal privilege.38 The Ohio court that invalidated that state's spiri~ 
tual treatment exemption to medical neglect laws on equal protection 
grounds recognized this limitation on rights to self~determination 
when it stated: 
[I] tis not the personal religious practices of these parents which are 
sought to be regulated. An important line must be drawn between 
the right of an individual to practice his religion by refusing medi-
cal treatment for his own illness and that of a parent to practice his 
religion by refusing to obtain or permit medical treatment for an~ 
other person, i.e., his child. This court, as with any governmental 
entity, can neither know nor care whether someone who relies 
solely on faith healing for his own affliction is religiously or scriptur-
ally "correct." But the right to hold one's own religious beliefs, and 
to act in conformity with those beliefs, does not and cannot include 
the right to endanger the life or health of others, including his or 
her children.39 
At a minimum, then, parents should not be deemed holders of rights 
that have greater force than the rights of their children. The chil~ 
dren's rights should therefore be dispositive. 
Academic supporters of parental rights often echo the courts in 
reciting the syllogism that because parents have a fundamental inter-
est in raising their children, parents should have child~rearing 
rights.40 Neither these academics nor the courts seem to have much 
understanding of what makes an interest fundamental. It surely is not 
the subjective importance people assign to having their wishes ful~ 
filled. A fundamental interest is a basic component of well being, fttl~ 
fillment of which is prerequisite to pursuing any higher aims in life.41 
Health and elementary and secondary education are interests of that 
sort. Child rearing is not; it is, rather, one of the higher aims that 
38 For an extended argument along these lines, see id. For an explanation of the 
distinction between a right and a privilege, see id. at 1374-75. 
39 Ohio v. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d 931, 934 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1984) (emphasis 
added). 
40 See, e.g., William Galston, Expressive Liberty, Moral Pluralism, Political Pluralism: 
Three Sources of Liberal Theory, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 869, 874 (1999); Stephen G. 
Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 937, 940 
(1996); seealsoSantoskyv. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,753 (1982) (describing the ability to 
make decisions regarding child rearing as a "fundamental liberty interest"); Wiscon· 
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (conferring on Amish parents a constitutional 
right to keep their high school age children out of school by relying on "the funda· 
mental interest of parents ... to guide the religious future and education of their 
children"}. 
41 See FEINBERG, supra note 27, at 37-38. 
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some of us choose to pursue.42 In any event, what is under considera-
tion in the debate over spiritual treatment exemptions is not the pros-
pect of denying some adults any opportunity to raise children, but 
rather simply denying parents the power to effectuate one particular 
choice regarding their children's lives. Surely, having that power is 
not fundamental to any adult's well being.43 
In sum, both a utilitarian approach and a rights-based approach 
tentatively support the conclusion that spiritual treatment exemptions 
are morally and legally impermissible. A more definite conclusion 
would require empirical investigation and analysis of a kind that has 
yet to be done. But it is plausible to think that if a child is likely to 
incur substantial suffering or significant long-term harm as a result of 
not receiving medical care, then the child's interests in receiving care 
out:wdgh all competing interests. When that is the case, the State 
should require medical care regardless of what the child's parents be-
lieve, because the child is entitled to protection of his or her basic 
welfare. 
C. Should the State Defer to the Insiders' Perspective? 
Some supporters of spiritual treatment exemptions recognize 
that they cannot simply ignore the welfare and rights of the children 
involved and adopt an alternative strategy to supporting the conclu-
sion that parents in these religious groups should be able to deny 
their children medical care. They ask, "v\Tho determines what a 
child's interests are?" and answer this question by asserting that par-
ents have a right to do so and the State does not. 44 They then point 
out that the parents in these religious groups have a different perspec-
tive on human welfare and that, from the parents' perspective, the 
children are better off not receiving medical care.45 
42 See id. at 37 (including "successfully raising a family" among those human in-
terests that are "ulterior" rather than fundamental). 
43 CJ. Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228, 1236 {Mass. 1997) (holding that re-
striction on non-custodial parent's e.'\.l'Osure of children to his religion's beliefs and 
services did not violate his parental or free exercise rights and concluding that "re-
quiring only that he limit sharing certain aspects of his beliefs ,.,ith his children" im-
posed only a minimal burden on those rights and was justified by a finding that the 
restriction was in the best interests of the children). 
44 See, e.g., Ingram, supra note 1, at 65 ("The first amendment prohibits the state 
from prescribing that physical life on earth is more important than life hereafter •••• 
[P]arents have the right to make that decision for their children .••• ");DiCamillo, 
supra note 3, at 157; Robinson, supra note 23, at 415-16, 431. 
45 See, e.g., Ingram, supra note 1, at 58, 62-65; Ledennan, supra note 7. at 923. 
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This brings us, then, to the final issue-whether the State should 
defer to the insiders' perspective. Essentially, what most supporters of 
spiritual treatment exemptions to medical neglect laws argue is not 
that extensive exemptions are compelled by a proper balancing of in-
terests as the State sees them, but rather that the State's view of what a 
child's interests are should not be controlling. They contend that the 
parents' view of what a child's interests are and of how best to prcr 
mote them should instead be controlling in children's lives.46 
This is distinct from a claim simply for parental freedom, for non-
interference with actions motivated by personal belief. I considered 
that claim above and concluded that it is, at best, very weak in this 
context, where the freedom for which protection is sought is freedom 
to control the lives of other persons rather than to engage in self-
determination. The claim here is about spheres of authority. It is es-
sentially a claim about the proper domain of the State. It is a claim 
that parental control over children's lives is primordial, outside the 
public realm, and no business of the State. 
Curiously, though, most proponents of this sort of "spheres of 
authority" position allow for state control over child rearing at the 
margins. The State may step in to prevent death.47 But they provide 
no real explanation for this qualification of the separate spheres posi-
tion, for ceding some authority to the State. Instead, they may talk of 
bounds of reasonableness; parents' choices should control unless they 
are unreasonable, and a choice that will lead to a child's death is un-
reasonable.48 However, not only do supporters of exemptions fail to 
offer a coherent account of what "reasonable" means, but they also 
never explain why this or any other standard should limit parental 
authority within the private domain. If it is truly a separate domain, 
then how can the State ever legitimately intrude into child rearing? 
They do not tell us. Nor do they provide an argument for postulating 
separate spheres in the first place. Nor an explanation of why the 
"family as separate sphere" position would not also apply in non-relig-
ious child-rearing contexts, and indeed to relations between spouses. 
Should domestic violence laws contain a religious exemption on the 
theory that abusive husbands are entitled to determine what their 
46 See, e.g., Ingram, supra note I, at 65; DiCamillo, supra note 3, at 143-44. 
47 See, e.g., Nobel, supra note 3, at 651, 710; Kearney, supra note 11, at 885. Scv· 
eral courts have also taken this position, drawing the line of permissible court inter· 
vention between life-threatening and other conditions. See Dwyer, supra note 19, at 
1356. 
48 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 11, at 1523-25 (arguing that courts should judge 
parents' conduct in denying medical care to children by a subjective rather than ob-
jective standard of reasonableness); Steckler, supra note 8, at 517 (same). 
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wives' best interests are, at least so long as their wives do not object?49 
If not, then supporters of spiritual treatment exemptions need to ex-
plain why not. 
In any event, the reality is that the family is not a separate, pri-
mordial sphere that is or can be cordoned off from the power of the 
State. The law creates the family, and things could not be otherwise. 5° 
The State assigns legal custody to particular adults for each and every 
child at the time of birth, reassigns custody at later points in the lives 
of a large percentage of children (for example, in connection with a 
divorce), and attaches to custody numerous legal rights and powers. 
Without the law creating and protecting parent-child relationships in 
this way, chaos would reign. So the separate spheres argument, in 
addition to being theoretically ungrounded, is out of touch with real-
ity. It therefore fails as a basis for the position that the State should 
defer to the views of religious parents as to what constitutes the inter-
ests and rights of their children. The State does and must establish 
the rules for parental control over children's lives and, in doing so, 
must rest its judgment on assumptions about children's interests and 
rights as it sees them. In doing so, the State might justifiably conclude 
that parents should have presumptive authority to make decisions for 
children in many aspects of their lives, because the State has good 
reason to believe that it is, in general, best for children that their par-
49 For a description and critique of cases in which criminal defendants ha\'C 
based a defense to charges of rape, kidnap, and other crimes against adult (usually 
female) victims on the defendant's holding non-western cultural beliefs, sec generally 
Doriane Lambelet Coleman, lnditridualizi7lgjustic~ Tllrouglt Mullicullumlism: Tile liber-
als' Dilemma, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 1093 (1996). Coleman points out that arguments for 
a cultural defense in such adult contexts have numerous problems: tltC)' O\'erlook tlte 
fact that the primary function of the criminal law is to protect \ictims and tlle public 
generally from harmful conduct; excusing conduct on tlte basis of cultural beliefs 
sends the message that such conduct is acceptable, and so persons inclined to engage 
in such behavior have no reason to conform to majorltarian nonns; basing culpability 
on the culture of the victim amounts to a \iolation of equal protection guamntees and 
sends a message to subordinate members of cultural minorities tl1at tltey are not wor· 
thy of the protection of our laws and cannot hope to escape tl1e oppressive practices 
of the culture of their upbringing; and condoning practices moti\'ated by \-alues and 
attitudes that we as a society have rejected erodes the progress we ha,·e made toward 
eliminating injustice and the treatment of certain classes of persons as less worth)' 
human beings. See id. at 1136-44. All of these problems also afflict arguments for 
religious exemptions to child neglect laws. 
50 See generally Frances E. Olsen, The 1.\~l·tlt of State l711ert!etllion iu tile Famil)'. 18 U. 
MICH.j.L. REFoRM 835 (1985) (demonstrating tl1at what is generall)' \icwed as state 
non-intervention in the family is actually just anotlter kind of state inten·cntion-
namely, state creation and enforcement of legal rights for tlte dominant person in 
family relationships). 
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ents have that presumptive authority. What supporters of spiritual 
treatment exemptions need to argue is that the State has good reason 
to believe that it is best for children that their parents have authority 
to deny them medical care that the State deems necessary for the chil-
dren's physical well-being whenever such care conflicts with the par-
ents' religious beliefs. They have yet to offer any such reason. 
III. RESPONSES TO OBJECTIONS 
Certain objections arise with some regularity to the position that 
children are entitled to greater restrictions on parental child rearing 
freedom than currently exist. Many of these are variants on a few core 
ideas. I have responded above to certain variants of these ideas, but 
want to address other variants more explicitly here. They are the 
claims that (1) parents are, as an empirical matter, best positioned to 
decide what is best for their children, (2) parents have a greater moral 
claim than the State to make decisions about children's lives, (3) the 
State has insufficient interest in child rearing absent extreme harm to 
children, and ( 4) the State may not assume that parents' religious be-
liefs are false. 
A. Parents Are in the Best Position to Decide 
A common refrain among those who endorse plenary parental 
control over children's lives, in this and other contexts, is that parents 
are in a better position than the State to decide what is best for chil-
dren. 51 The claim is often stated in very broad terms; in any area of a 
child's life-medical care, education, discipline, et cetera-parents 
know best. 52 What is the basis for that assertion? It is really a deduc-
tive argument rather than a conclusion drawn from empirical evi· 
dence. The syllogism goes like this: Parents love their children more 
than anyone else loves them and know their children better than any-
one else knows them. Therefore, parents are the best decision· 
makers. 53 
This is clearly inadequate as an argument for parental authority 
in any aspect of children's lives. One could respond by challenging 
the premise that all parents know and love their children best, by 
51 See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 40, at 953-57; Ingram, supra note 1, at 58-59; cj. 
Parham v.J.R, 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("The law's concept of the family •.• histori· 
cally ... has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best 
interests of their children." (citations omitted)). 
52 See, e.g., Ingram, supra note 1, at 58-59. 
53 Stephen Gilles argues for plenary parental control over children's education 
along these lines. See Gilles, supra note 40, at 953-60. 
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pointing out that far too many parents give far too little love and at-
tention to their children. 5 4 One could also point out that in religious 
contexts, such as that of spiritual treatment exemptions or that of re-
ligious objections to school curriculum, there is the problem of com-
peting motivations. Parents motivated by a sense of religious 
obligation to oppose mainstream child-rearing norms might be, by 
virtue of that motivation, less likely to make decisions and act in a 
manner consistent ·with their children's welfare, even as they view 
their children's welfare from their own perspective. Because religious 
commands regarding child rearing are not necessarily dictated by 
what is best for children, even as seen from within the religious per-
spective from which the command emanates, a parent's sense of relig-
ious obligation might detract from or override the motivation, which a 
parent otherwise has, to do what is best for a child. The Old Testa-
ment story of Abraham preparing to stab to death and burn his son 
Isaac at God's command illustrates the potential conflict quite well.5:; 
In light of this fact about religious obligation, it is ironic that this argu-
ment from parental motivation usually appears in support of special 
exemptions from legal child-rearing responsibilities for parents who 
oppose mainstream child-rearing norms on religious grounds. 56 One 
might think that parents have a stronger claim for an exemption when 
motivated by an alternative secular view of what is best for children-
for example, by a scientifically-based view that certain vaccines create 
risks of harm that outweigh potential benefits for individual children, 
or that some illnesses, such as the flu, are best treated by letting the 
body develop and deploy its own defenses, rather than by administer-
ing drugs that a doctor might prescribe. 
A larger problem with this objection, though, is that even if it were 
true that all parents were perfectly loving and whole-heartedly com-
mitted to parenting, the implicit major premise in the syllogism 
above-that this is all it takes to be a good parent or to make the best 
decisions for a child-is clearly false. Many factors go into making 
good decisions for one's children. Loving concern is just one such 
factor. Also critical are competence and knowledge, and merely living 
·with a child does not supply much of either. 
54 CJ. BRUCE A CHADWICK & TIM B. HEATON, STATISTIC\L R~'DBOOR ON THE 
AMERICAN FAMn.Y 135-36 (2d ed. 1999) (indicating that there were over one million 
child victims of substantiated maltreatment-including emotional abuse, sexual 
abuse, physical abuse, and neglect-in the United States in 1995 and almost three 
million children reported to be victims of parental abuse or neglect in that year). 
55 Genesis 22:1-14. There is no indication in this biblical story that Abrnham be-
lieved killing Isaac would be good for Isaac. 
56 See supra note 22. 
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Living with a child makes one more aware than other people of 
what a child's unique interests and temperament are, but that is not 
sufficient to inform a decision regarding proper nutrition, health 
care, education, et cetera. There is a great deal to know about chil-
dren's development that is more general in nature, that is not unique 
to one's own child, and that is not apparent simply from looking at 
and interacting with a child. If that were not the case, there would be 
no point in having medical schools train pediatricians or having 
schools of education train teachers. I am certain that my wife and I 
love our two daughters more than anyone else does and that we know 
better than anyone else what our daughters' personalities are like, 
what makes them laugh and what upsets them. But I am also certain 
that on almost any significant decision we have to make about their 
lives, there are people who have made a career of studying that aspect 
of child rearing who could tell us a lot we would not otherwise know 
about what is generally best for children in that regard. Simply loving 
and interacting with our children tells us little about how to make 
such decisions. 
That competence and knowledge are critical, and that many par-
ents make little effort to acquire them, is evident from the bad chokes 
that parents in this country make on a routine basis. Listening to pro-
ponents of the "parents know best" mantra, one might suppose that 
few parents in this country feed their children junk food on a regular 
basis, that few parents in this country allow their children to watch 
garbage television or play shoot-and-kill video games for most of their 
time outside of school, and that few parents in this country do such a 
poor job of instilling self-discipline and self-respect that their children 
become teen delinquents or school dropouts. I am not suggesting 
here that state officials are all-knowing or that the State should be 
legislating what children eat for breakfast and what children do at 
home after school, but rather that "parents know best" is not a particu-
larly credible response to an argument for increased restriction of pa· 
rental freedom in hardly any area of children's lives. Parents vary 
tremendously in their competence to make good choices for their 
children, and the number of parents whose ability is quite low is not 
trivial. 57 
57 Cj CHADWICK & HEATON, supra note 54, at 118 (showing that 49% of parents 
say they do not restrict the amount of television their five to seventeen year-old chil· 
dren watch and that 19% say they do not restrict the content of what their children 
watch); id. at 117 (showing that 94% of parents allow their children to be home alone 
after school, at night, and even overnight); id. at 115 (showing that 10% of children 
have been suspended or expelled from school and that 2.4% drop out of school); id. 
at 113 (showing that 10% of parents give themselves a grade of C or worse for the 
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Talk about competence, however, is really beside the point in the 
present context. In religious child-rearing conte.xts, there is a more 
fundamental problem ·with the "parents know best" position that its 
proponents overlook. It does not make sense to argue that parents 
know better than the State how to promote children's welfare when 
parents have an entirely different view of what constitutes a child's 
welfare, or have a view as to how to promote their child's temporal 
welfare that is based on faith rather than on the kinds of empirical 
evidence on which the State must rely. If parents believe their chil-
dren's welfare consists principally in eternal salvation and temporal 
well-being should be sacrificed whenever necessary to secure that ulti-
mate good, then comparing their ability to act in their children's best 
interests with the State's ability is comparing apples and oranges. The 
State does not aim to secure salvation for any of us; it aims at promot-
ing temporal well-being. Likewise, if some parents are convinced that 
prayer is sufficient treatment for meningitis and that also administer-
ing penicillin would be counter-productive, what separates them from 
doctors and state health officials is not a degree of competence but 
rather religious belief. Their greater love for and familiarity with their 
children is irrelevant to the question the State must answer--whether 
their children should receive penicillin. 
What opponents of restrictions on parenting in religious con-
texts, such as the spiritual treatment debate, need to argue is that par-
ents are entitled to define what the aims are for their children and 
what sources of instruction on healing are authoritative. They must 
argue that parents have a right to preclude the State from deciding 
that the proper aim for the child, until the child grows up and decides 
for herself wherein her welfare resides, is temporal well-being or from 
deciding that the best conclusions of the scientific community are au-
thoritative. Relative motivation and competence have nothing to do 
with those issues. Asserting that parents love most and know best is 
simply talking around the real issue in these religious child-rearing 
cases. 5 8 
quality of their parenting); id. at 124 (reporting the results of a sul"\'ey of parents 
showing that 29% seldom or never have calm discussions \\ith their children about 
serious disagreements between them); id. at 104 (showing that 20% of parents report 
almost never talking with their children about things that worry the children and that 
62% report almost never talking with their children about things that excite the chit. 
dren);JosEPH P. V1T.£RITI1, CHoosiNG EQ.UAUIY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CoNSTtTUTJo:-:. 
AND CIVIL SoCIETY 9 (1999) (noting the great disparity among parents in their ability 
to make intelligent choices about their children's education). 
58 Stephen Gilles, addressing authority over children's education. appears to take 
the position that the State should conclude that parents, at least when moti\"ated by 
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B. Parents Have a Greater Moral Claim to Decide for Children 
More relevant to the issue of who gets to define the ends of child 
rearing is the assertion that parents have a superior moral claim to 
that power than the State does. 59 Some liberals-so called "liberal 
statists"-do appear to take the position that the State has a superior 
moral claim to that power in some areas of children's lives. Amy Gut-
mann has argued, for example, that society as a whole, acting through 
the instrumentality of the State, is entitled to control children's educa-
tion to a substantial degree in order to seiVe certain collective ends-
principally the reproduction of democratic culture from one genera-
tion to the next. 6° But that is certainly not the only logical alternative 
religious belief, are entitled to plenary control of this aspect of children's lives be· 
cause parents have greater incentive to further their children's interests as they perceiVt' 
them than the State has to further children's interests as it perceives them. See Gilles, 
supra note 40, at 940. He adds as an important proviso, though, that parents must be 
acting within bounds of reasonableness and he appears to presume that the State will 
define what those bounds are (who else would do it?). See id. But for the State to 
reach the conclusion Gilles urges regarding parental entitlement, the State would 
have to assume that, from its perspective, it is good for children to have promoted 
their interests as their parents perceive them. This in tum would require the State to 
regard the parents' perception as accurate, or at least plausible, based on the State's 
own criteria for children's welfare. The State could not rationally conclude from the 
fact of high parental motivation that parental control is best if the parents' view of 
what is best for their children entails, from the State's perspective, great physical 
harm, educational deprivation, or other harm. In fact, the high motivation of such 
parents would be reason to give them less control. Thus, the fact that parents have ~\ 
different worldview cannot carry any independent weight; the State must define the 
permissible range of parental choices, based on its own standards and empirical as-
sumptions, and afford parents only the freedom to choose within that range. The 
critical question is simply how broad the range should be, or how much freedom the 
State should give parents to depart from the State's judgments. In Gilles's theory, 
"reasonableness" ends up doing all the heavy lifting, but he never gives material fo1m 
to that phantom concept. As noted above in the text, this is par for the course among 
proponents of extensive parental religious freedom. Gilles offers no reason why the 
State should not conclude that parents act unreasonably, regardless of what motivates 
them, if they act significantly contrary to what the State regards as in children's best 
interests. 
59 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 23, at 431; cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 
(1979) ("[O]ur constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that a child is 'the 
mere creature of the State' and, on the contrary, asserted that parents generally 'have 
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their children] for 
additional obligations.'" (citations omitted)). 
60 See AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 14 (rev. ed. 1999). Courts, tCJO, 
when acting to restrict parenting practices deemed hannful, often do so to serve in· 
terests of society as a whole rather than for the sake of the individual child at issue. 
See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 870 (Cal. 1988) ("Imposition of 
felony liability for endangering or killing an ill child by failing to provide medical care 
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to the position that parents are entitled to decide what the aims are 
for their children's lives. In my view, neither parents nor the State 
have any moral claim on their own behalf, any entitlement to decide 
what the ends of a child's life are. Rather, only children themselves 
have any moral claim or entitlement in connection with their upbring-
ing, and we adults should be deliberating about how best to fulfill our 
obligation to them, not about which adults are entitled to determine 
how children's lives ·will go. Talk of superior moral claims of this sort 
effectively treats children and children's lives instrumentally, as means 
for satisfying the interests of one or another group of adults, and that 
is morally inappropriate. I have suggested in this Essay that the best 
vvay to fulfill the rights of children is to protect and promote their 
healthy development into adults, who can decide for themselves the 
aims for their lives. 
C. The State Has Insufficient Interest Absent Extreme Harm 
Related to the assertion of superior parental moral claim is the 
position that, except in life-threatening situations, the State does not 
have sufficient reason to restrict parental decision making. As noted 
above, most supporters of spiritual treatment exemptions concede 
that the State may step in to prevent death. In such extreme cases, 
they are willing to allow the child's interests to prevail. But when they 
discuss less extreme cases, supporters of exemptions are unable to 
maintain a focus on the child's interests and rights; they shift to a 
discussion of state interests and parental rights. They characterize the 
problem as one of deciding who "owns" the child.61 Putting the mat-
ter in those terms makes it easier to say that parental choices should 
prevail; no one would seriously maintain that children are owned by 
the State. But insofar as the State's interest is in promoting the child's 
welfare, in its parens patriae role, rather than in avoiding negative con-
sequences for the rest of society, the contest is really bet\veen the 
child's welfare and parental preferences. In saying that parental 
rights prevail in intermediate cases, supporters of exemptions are re-
ally saying that parental preferences should trump children's welfare. 
If that is not what they believe, but believe instead that in intermediate 
furthers an interest of unparalleled significance: the protection of the \'ery li\'es of 
California's children, upon whose 'healthy, well-rounded growth . . . into full maturity 
as citizens' our 'democratic society rests, for its continuance."' (quoting Prince v. Mas-
sachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944))). 
61 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 23, at 431 (identit}ing as "the fundamental prin-
ciple at stake: Who 'owns' the child and who will determine what (including religion) 
is in the child's best interest. Vvill it be the state or the parents?"). 
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cases religious exemptions best serve children's interests, then why do 
they not say so? If they were truly concerned about the children and 
intent on always doing what is best for the children, why would they 
slip into a "parents' rights versus state interests" mode? One begins to 
suspect that the concession of state intervention to prevent death is 
merely a gesture designed to ward off the charge of ignoring children 
and not evidence of real commitment to children's welfare. 
D. The State May Not Assume That Parents' Religious Beliefs Are False 
I noted in Part I above that the State in our society may not as-
sume the truth of religious beliefs. The principle of church-state sepa-
ration embodied in the Establishment Clause precludes it from doing 
so.62 Some supporters of religious exemptions to medical neglect laws 
counter that the State also may not assume that parents' religious be-
liefs are false, and they infer from this premise that the State may not 
override parental choices that are based on religious beliefs. 63 
The premise itself is subject to challenge. Arguably, the State 
must routinely assume that a multitude of possible or actually held 
religious beliefs are false, in order for it to carry on at all. Some peo-
ple might have the religious belief, for example, that if the State at-
tempts to tax citizens then God ·will wipe out human civilization. 
Given the magnitude of the threatened divine punishment, it would 
be irrational for the State to impose taxes unless the possibility of that 
belief being true were zero or very close to zero. Thus, to carry on, 
the State must assume that the belief is false, or at least exceedingly 
unlikely to be true. One can easily imagine other examples of beliefs 
that state officials must routinely treat as false. 
The greater problem with this line of argument, though, is that it 
reflects a fundamental confusion about principles of liberal govern-
ment. The argument essentially transports the argument for protec-
tion of self-determination to the child-rearing context, which, as 
noted above, is not a matter of self-determination. When adults have 
religious beliefs that lead them to direct their own lives in ways contrary 
to secular or common views of human welfare, liberalism holds that 
the State may not, on the basis of an assumption that the persons' 
religious beliefs are false, try to coercively change the persons' beliefs 
or prohibit them from directing their own lives in accordance with 
those beliefs, absent threat of harm to others. Thus, if my religious 
beliefs tell me I should not accept medical care for myself if I become 
62 See supra note 6. 
63 See, e.g., Ingram, supra note I, at 63; Lederman, supra note 7, at 921; Steckler, 
supra note 8, at 514-15. 
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sick or injured, liberal principles require the State to forbear from 
trying to convince me that my religious beliefs are false and from com-
pelling me to accept medical care for myself, absent threat of harm to 
others (for example, if I might spread infectious disease). 
But that is all that anyone is due in a liberal society with respect to 
their religious beliefs. Liberal principles do not preclude the State 
from overriding religiously-motivated choices that affect other people 
in order to protect other people from what the State regards as 
harm. 64 In other words, liberal protections do not extend beyond self-
determination. A contrary rule, that the State must forbear from re-
stricting any religiously-motivated conduct, no matter who it will af. 
feet, because the State may not assume that the motivating beliefs are 
false, would lead to chaos and mayhem. Under such a rule, I could 
stone my neighbor with impunity if my religious beliefs told me that 
doing so would help to save his soul. Yet that is essentially what is 
being advocated when supporters of spiritual treatment exemptions 
argue that the State may not restrict religiously-motivated parenting 
choices, because it may not assume that any religious beliefs are 
false. 65 Generalizing the argument to religiously-motivated conduct 
64 Cf. Ohio v. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d 931, 934 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1984). In re-
jecting a parental free e."ercise claim to a religious e.xemption to medical neglect laws, 
the court stated: 
I d. 
[T]his court, as with any governmental entity, can neither know nor care 
whether someone who relies solely on faith healing for his own aflliction is 
religiously or scripturally "correct." But the right to hold one's own religious 
beliefs, and to act in conformity with those beliefs, does not and cannot in-
clude the right to endanger the life or health of others, including his or her 
children. 
65 Some have couched the argument against the State assuming the falsity of re-
ligious beliefs in terms of the religious beliefs of the children themselves. Set, e.g., 
Ingram, supra note 1, at 63. With respect to very young children, that argument de-
pends upon a prediction about children's beliefs at some point in the future. Even if 
any predictions were reliable, determining what the rele\'allt future point in time 
·would be-for example, when the child is old enough to speak, when the child is old 
enough to think independently, when the child reaches adulthood-would be a difii-
cult task that proponents of the argument ha\'e not undertaken. With respect to 
older children-for example, teenagers-complex questions regarding the appropri-
ateness of deferring to children's expressed wishes arise, and proponents of this argu-
ment have not undertaken to answer those questions either. But cf. Jennifer L. 
Rosato, The Ultimate Test of Autcnomy: Slwuld Minors Have a Right to Mal:e Decisions Re-
garding Lift-Sustaining Treatment?, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 49-51 (1996) (arguing that 
young children should not have a right to refuse medical care but that "mature mi-
nors" with terminal illnesses should have a right to reject life-sustaining treatment in 
limited circumstances). As Rosato notes, current law is largely opposed to the \iew 
that minors should have the power to refuse medical care for themsel\'es when thC)' 
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affecting any other person-and its proponents offer no reason why it 
need not be-reveals its lack of principled foundation and its unac-
ceptable implications. 
CONCLUSION 
When parents seek to direct their children's lives in ways other-
wise prohibited by law, they are necessarily asking the State to make a 
decision about their children's lives. They are asking the State to 
change the rules for them. There may be good reasons for doing so 
in some cases, but they must be reasons the State can endorse, from its 
perspective. I have argued that, from the State's perspective, there is 
no good reason to include spiritual treatment exemptions in medical 
neglect laws and strong reasons-the welfare and rights of children-
not to include such exemptions. 
I close ·with an observation about the style of argument in debates 
over state regulation of religious child rearing, including debates in 
the realm of education as well as in the realm of medical care. There 
is a great deal of ad hoc "reasoning" in debates about state restrictions 
on parental freedom. The rhetoric one typically hears would suggest 
many people believe that the situation of children is entirely unique, 
that there are no commonalities between children and other people, 
and no general principles can be called on to reason about allocation 
of authority over children's lives. IT that were true, though, there 
would be little point in debating child-rearing issues. If competing 
positions could not be justified by appeal to general principles, then 
participants in the debate could do no more than shout at one an-
other, with no prospect of anyone demonstrating that others should 
agree with him. 
To the best of my knowledge, no one has ever demonstrated that 
~e situation of children is entirely sui generis. Simply acknowledging 
are seriously ill. See id. at 17. For an argument against creating a mature minor doc-
trine in these cases, see Jessica A Penkower, Comment, The Potential Right of Clmmi· 
caUy IU Adolescents to &fuse Life-Saving Medical Treatment-Fatal Misuse of the Maturt' 
Minor Dodrine, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 1165 (1996). Compare Prince v. Massachusetts, 
where the Court stated: 
[T]he mere fact a state could not wholly prohibit this form of adult activ· 
ity ... does not mean it cannot do so for children .... The state's authority 
over children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults ..•. A 
democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded 
growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It 
may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad 
range of selection. 
321 u.s. 158, 168 (1944). 
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that children are persons, as everyone appears ,.,illing to do these 
days, implies that some general principles are relevant to decision mak-
ing about their lives. There are widely shared moral beliefs and legal 
rules about how we should treat people simply by virtue of their per-
sonhood. In addition, what at first blush seems to make children's 
situation factually unique, at least to those who ordinarily think only 
about relations among autonomous adults-namely, their depen-
dence and relative lack of autonomy-are actually characteristics they 
share ·with many adults. This suggests that certain additional princi-
ples-namely, those generally applicable to dependent, non-autono-
mous persons-should apply to children's lives. 
Yet rarely do participants in debates over state regulation of child 
rearing consider whether and to what extent general principles re-
garding treatment of dependent, non-autonomous persons, or gen-
eral principles regarding treatment of individuals in light of their 
personhood, should govem decision making about children's lives. 
That is a major shortcoming of the debates. In this Essay, I have sug-
gested ways in which the issue of spiritual treatment exemptions might 
be informed by appeal to general principles regarding the respect due 
individuals as persons and by comparison to our beliefs about the 
proper approach to medical decision making on behalf of non-auton-
omous adults. Both approaches support the conclusion that spiritual 
treatment exemptions are unlawful and immoral to the extent they 
cannot be justified in terms of what is best, from the State's perspec-
tive, for the children whose welfare is at stake. 
